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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible channels of
tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel of provincial-
level data for 1993-2007, we find strong evidence of strategic tax interaction among
provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average effective tax rates
on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign in-
vestors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature, we
also highlight the impact of each province’s characteristics (including its size and level
of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. Finally, the paper
explicitly identifies the establishment of development zones as an important conduit
for tax competition among provinces.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Explaining the “miracle” of China’s economic growth over the past three decades remains
a challenging task. Recent studies have emphasized the role of local governments, essentially
arguing that the main engine for growth has been a series of institutional reforms during the
transition process which created large fiscal and political incentives for local governments to
promote economic development and eventually evolving into a fierce competition for foreign
capital (Gordon and Li, 2011; Xu, 2011). Along with the rapid economic growth observed in
this period, the explosive boom in “economic development zones”,1 and the resulting losses
of large amounts of agricultural land is another phenomenon that has attracted a great deal
of attention in academic and policy circles (Cartier, 2001; Yang and Wang, 2008). A natural
question that followed was whether the booming in development zones were related to the
competing behaviors of local governments driven by the strong fiscal and political incentives
they faced? Many scholars contend this has been the case (Xu, 2011; Zhang, 2011).
Since China is a unitary country with the central government setting uniform statu-
tory tax rates across all provinces, the standard tax competition theory describing inter-
jurisdictional competition through selecting tax rates does not apply automatically in the
Chinese context. However, the favorable policies in development zones granted by the central
government created high levels of administrative discretion for local governments to manip-
ulate the effective tax rate faced by foreign investors locating in their jurisdictions, which,
in turn, enabled local governments to compete for foreign investment (Xu, 2011). More
specifically, local governments started to set up and use their own development zones as a
conduit to offer tax incentives (e.g., tax exemptions, tax breaks, and preferential tax rates)
to foreign investors.2 Consequently, the “development zone fever” emerged as a showcase of
inter-jurisdictional competition in China (Zhang, 2011).
Beyond this wide recognition, it is surprising to see that rigorous empirical evidence in
support of these competing patterns and, especially, an account of the possible mechanisms
through which this competition has been conducted are largely missing in the literature.3
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This paper contributes to the literature in several significant ways. First, this paper is among
the first to provide empirical evidence on provincial tax competition for foreign investment
in China. Second, the paper provides evidence on the role played by the establishment of
development zones as a vehicle for conducting provincial tax competition in China. Third,
the paper employs two alternative methods to measure the average effect tax rate on foreign
investment which take into account the tax incentives enjoyed by foreign investors. Lastly,
based on the theoretical predictions derived in the tax competition literature, the paper
examines the impact of each province’s characteristics (i.e., size and level of industrialization)
on the strategic interaction with its neighbors.
Using a panel of 30 Chinese provinces for 1993-2007 and applying both dynamic spatial
lag specifications and structural models, we find that: (i) there is strong evidence on a
positive strategic tax interaction among provincial governments; (ii) both province size and
industrialization level have a positive effect on the tax rates chosen by the provinces, with the
effect from the former generally being less significant; (iii) the introduction of development
zones leads to significant reductions of effective tax rates, which in turn successfully helps
attract more foreign investment; and (iv) more intensive use of development zones does not
necessarily lead to lower tax effective rates on foreign investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional setup
on China that induces provincial governments to compete with each other; the particular
mechanism through which the competition is actually conducted; and the baseline hypotheses
derived from the theoretical tax competition literature to form the empirical identification
strategy. Section 3 sets up the empirical methodology and discusses the data. Section 4
presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, MECHANISM, AND HY-
POTHESES
Institutional Background
A distinctive feature of China’s transition from a highly planned to a market economy
has been its success in fostering strong fiscal and political incentives for local governments to
promote local economic development (Gordon and Li, 2011; Xu, 2011). This has been largely
achieved by decentralizing the country’s fiscal system while maintaining rather centralized
political institutions.
Starting from the early 1980s, the previous fiscal system of “unified revenue collection
and unified spending” (tongshou tongzhi)4 was replaced by the so-called “fiscal contract-
ing system” (caizheng chengbao zhi), in which each province was assigned an independent
responsibility to collect tax revenues in its domain and was entitled to retain a significant
portion of the revenues–any residual “fiscal profits”– after they fulfilled the pre-determined
sharing schemes. Local officials were thus motivated by the incentive contracts to promote
local business development, which eventually increased their residual “fiscal profits” (Oi,
1992). In the meantime, administrative decentralization was also implemented to enhance
the authorities of local governments in appointing subordinate government officials, approv-
ing investment, and allocating resources that could be used to attract foreign investors. This
extensive administrative and fiscal decentralization reinforced each other in a way that fa-
cilitated the role of local governments in promoting economic development and enhanced
regional competition for mobile tax bases. In light of this significant institutional transfor-
mation, some authors proceeded to label it as “Chinese-style, fiscal federalism”, under which
local governments played the function of “market-preserving” by supporting local business
development (Qian and Weingast, 1997).
Nevertheless, after over a decade of the “fiscal contracting system”, the marked declines
in both the share of the central government revenues in total budgetary revenues and the
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share of total budgetary revenues in GDP generated great concern at the central government
level. This finally led to the “tax sharing system” (TSS) reform of 1994. This reform
had the twin objectives of raising the central government’s revenues and strengthening the
control of the central government over the fiscal system. With the TSS, all taxes were
classified into three categories: central taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes. Meanwhile,
separate central (state) and local tax administration bureaus were established. The state
tax bureau was put in charge of central and most of the shared taxes, while local tax bureaus
were made responsible for collecting local taxes. Although the introduction of the TSS was
successful in hardening the budget constraint of local governments, the fiscal incentives for
local governments to compete for outside capital– and so for economic development – largely
remained in place (Jin et al., 2005; Zheng, 2006; Zhang, 2011). Despite the recentralization
of revenue assignments in 1994, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities remained
virtually unchanged.5 As a consequence, local officials experienced mounting fiscal pressures
for financing their expenditure needs. This added to the local incentives to support business
development to increase local and shared revenues. In order to cope, local officials also
continued to look for possibilities to raise revenues outside the budget system, mainly extra-
budgetary funds. Also via rent seeking and sometimes corrupt behavior, prosperous local
economies also yielded direct financial rewards for local officials, in the form of fringe benefits,
work-related travel expenses, and informal income (Zhang, 2011).
Beyond economic incentives, local officials also faced strong political incentives, which
helped explain the strong enthusiasm showed by local governments in promoting the local
economy (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). The political incentives were mainly generated
by the highly centralized political system in China with strong top-down mandates and a
homogeneous governance structure. Since local government officials are appointed by the
upper level government, the central authorities maintain absolute control in deciding the
promotion or dismissal of local officials, based on criteria strongly associated with improved
economic performance. Trying stay ahead of the professional career ladder, local officials
4
generated a system of open “yardstick competition”.6
In sum, the institutional transformation and economic reform in China created strong
fiscal and political incentives for local governments to promote local growth, which ultimately
mutated into fierce competition among local officials for capital, especially foreign capital.
Mechanisms of Competition
Given the highly centralized tax legislation in China, a practical question is how the fierce
tax competition for foreign capital was actually conducted. We argue that a significant part
of this had to do with the economic development zone policy that was launched by the
central government in the late 1970s.
These zones, which have received different names, are special government-designated
areas that aim to attract foreign investment and the transfer of foreign technology.7 The
zones granted preferential tax treatment and other benefits to foreign enterprises.8 These
included a reduced corporate income tax rate of 15 percent for foreign enterprises operating in
the zones, compared to a rate of 33 percent imposed on domestic investors; full tax exemption
in the first two profit-making years followed by a 50 percent reduction in tax liability during
the three following years; and tariff exemption on imported materials. In addition, provincial
governments have discretion to offer further local tax incentives, for example, a full waiver of
the additional 3 percent local corporate income tax; reduced rates for the property tax, the
urban construction tax, and the tax for occupation of arable land. Furthermore, provincial
governments also use informal, often illegal approaches to further reduce the effective tax
rates faced by foreign investors. This typically takes place in the form of illegally extending
the tax exemption period, enlarging the eligibility of foreign enterprises that can be admitted
to the zones, negotiating “revenue loss” contracts with enterprises to actually hide profits
from central taxation, and lowering tax collection effort (Zheng, 2006).9
In light of the large scope for discretion created by the development zones and the suc-
cessful experience in attracting foreign investment, provincial governments quickly involved
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themselves in a tax competition game.10 After the first development zone was approved in
Dalian city in 1984, thousands of others were rapidly established across the entire nation.
By the end of 1997, 30 out of 31 provinces (excepting Tibet) in China had built up their
own development zones. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the emergence and intensity of
development zones. It shows the expansion of zones from the coastal areas to the central
and western areas and a tendency to cluster in relatively well developed regions. Although
the legal authority for establishing zones is only assigned to the central and provincial gov-
ernments,11 lower-level governments quickly recognize the effectiveness of this tool and also
started to set up their own zones, looking for the approval of their provincial governments.
By one count, there were already 6,866 development zones in China in 2003, with a seized
land area amounting to 38.6 thousand square kilometers, a figure that is 35 percent higher
than the total urban build-up in China (Zhang, 2011). To highlight the effectiveness of de-
velopment zones as a tool for tax competition for foreign capital, according to the calculation
of the National Development and Reform Commission of China in 2003, the average effective
tax rate for foreign enterprises inside development zones was approximately 11 percent, a
value that was 16.9 percent lower than for the enterprises outside the zones, which faced a
rate of 27.9 percent; total FDI located in 45 national-level development zones (out of 6,866
total development zones at all levels) was 10.3 billion USD, a value that was equivalent to
19.3 percent of total FDI received in the whole nation in 2003.12
Basic Hypotheses
In this subsection, we present a brief overview of the theoretical tax competition literature
to form the baseline structure for our empirical identification.
Recent theoretical studies in this area originate in the fundamental work of Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). These studies reach the current “benchmark
conclusion” for this literature that, inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases leads
to a tendency towards inefficiently low tax rates.13 This is so because each jurisdiction faces
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an incentive to keep its tax rate low in an attempt to preserve its tax base from flowing
to other jurisdictions. In particular, when individual jurisdiction is large relative to the
economy, it is able to affect the net return to capital in the economy by varying its tax rate;
this in turn implies that the impact of a jurisdiction’s choice of tax rate depends on the tax
rates elsewhere. Therefore, the optimal tax rate in one jurisdiction depends on the tax rates
in other jurisdictions, leading to the strategic interaction among jurisdictions [Hypothesis
1].14 Although theory shows that, depending on functional forms, this strategic interaction
can be either positive or negative; in almost all the related empirical studies, a positive
interaction has been found (e.g., Nelson, 2002; Brueckner, 2003; Leprince et al., 2007).15
Hypothesis 1 A province’s optimal tax rate on foreign investment strategically interacts
with those of the other provinces.
This early tax competition literature provides valuable insights into the nature of compe-
tition among governments. However, it relies heavily on the assumption that all jurisdictions
are identical and therefore choose the same tax rate. This assumption hides the potential for
inter-governmental conflict and so the model fails to explain the actual asymmetric policy
responses of governments as it is observed in some regions of the world.16 Particularly, this
assumption may not hold given the presence of exogenous asymmetries among the compet-
ing jurisdictions. A closer look at this issue has brought scholars’ attention to the role that
jurisdictional size may play in setting capital tax rates. Bucovetsky (1991); Wilson (1991)
and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) argue that in equilibrium a small jurisdiction tends to
set a lower tax rate than a large jurisdiction [Hypothesis 2], since the former faces a higher
elasticity of capital supply.17
Hypothesis 2 Smaller size provinces tend to set lower tax rate on foreign investment than
larger size provinces.
A separate literature argues that asymmetric policy responses may also emerge as a
consequence of agglomeration economies. Under different game settings, Kind et al. (2000);
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Ludema and Wooton (2000), and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) reach a similar conclusion
that industrial concentration in core regions generates “agglomeration rents” for the firms
located in these regions, which in turn provides these regions an ability to extract some of
these rents through higher taxation18 [Hypothesis 3]. Furthermore, Zissimos and Wooders
(2008) show that even without agglomeration economies, variation across firms in their
requirements for public goods yields the asymmetric outcome that the core regions may
set a higher tax rate and provide a higher level of public infrastructure than the periphery
regions. This is because the core regions with more efficient governments offer more-than-
proportional increases in the level of public good production, which in turn reduces the
production costs of the firms, making it optimal for some of them to pay higher taxes.
Applying this hypothesis to China, we can expect the validation of Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3 Provinces with higher level of industrialization tend to set higher tax rates
on foreign investment than provinces with lower level of industrialization.
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Our main empirical strategy is (i) to provide evidence on the existence of provincial tax
competition in China along with the validation of the three basic hypotheses stated in the
previous section; and (ii) to shed some light on the mechanism through which tax competition
is actually conducted in the Chinese context. We first follow the existing literature setting
up a dynamic spatial lag model to identify the competing behaviors of provinces, and then
discuss a structural model as a way to unveil the mechanism for competition we laid out in
the previous section. Before proceeding, we need to make two explicit assumptions. First,
given that the statutory tax rate is fixed across provinces in China, we assume that the
relevant tax rate is the average effective tax rate (AETR). Second, in line with the existence
of a multilevel local government structure in China, we refer to the provincial government
as a single entity that represents and captures all the competing behaviors of subnational
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governments in that particular province. This is justified because under China’s highly
centralized political system, provincial governments maintain absolute powers in appointing
local officials and deciding major local activities in their domains. In addition, besides
the central government, the authority for establishing development zones is only legally
assigned to provincial governments, which are also responsible for approving any setups of
development zones at the sub-provincial level.19
Identification of Provincial Tax Competition
Specification. Tax competition theory suggests that τit, the AETR of province i in year
t, is a reaction function of the tax rates chosen by its neighboring provinces. This gives us
a spatial lag specification in the most general form that has been widely employed in the
previous empirical research on tax competition (e.g., Devereux et al., 2008; Jacobs et al.,
2010; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012).
(1) τit = λτit−1 + δ
∑
j 6=i
wijτjt + γpopit−1 + θindustit−1 +Xit−1β + ηi + ttt + εit,
where τit−1 is a one period time-lagged dependent variable, which is included to account for
the high degree of persistence in tax policies;
∑
j 6=iwijτjt denotes the mean of the AETRs of
the provinces other than province i in year t, weighted by the predetermined weights (row-
normalized) wi1, ..., wiN ,
20 and on the basis of Hypothesis 1, we predict a nonzero sloped
reaction function, i.e., δ 6= 0; popit−1 is the population size of province i in year t − 1; it is
included to capture the effect of province size; industit−1 is our measure of industrialization
level of a province and following Zhang et al. (2004), it is measured as the ratio of non-
agricultural GDP to agricultural GDP of province i in year t − 1.21 As summarized in
Hypothesis 2 and 3, both the size and industrialization level of a province are viewed as
generating asymmetric tax policy responses among the provinces, and so we expect γ > 0
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and θ > 0. Both variables are lagged one period to avoid the potential endogeneity of
these variables. Furthermore, the specification includes state fixed effects (ηi) to control
for unobserved heterogeneity across provinces and also a linear time trend (ttt); εit is an
idiosyncratic error term.22
With the control variables Xit−1 we seek to capture the main determinants of tax rates
based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature. This leads to the inclusion of real
GDP per capita, openness, government consumption, urban population share, geographical
dummy variables, and tax reform dummy variable. Real GDP per capita serves as a measure
of income; higher incomes are generally related to stronger demand for public services which
may ultimately affect a province’s choice of tax policies. Openness, measured by the ratio
of imports plus exports to GDP, aims to capture the exposure of a province to trade and
competition for capital. Government consumption as a percentage of GDP is included to
account for the revenue need of the government. The proportion of urban population is
a proxy for the demographic features of a province that may also influence government’s
preference for tax policies.23 In addition, given the fact that many privileged policies were
granted to the coastal provinces at the beginning of China’s economic reforms in 1978, we
include a geographical dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the province is located in
coastal region and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, in order to account for the possible systematic
difference of the tax policies before and after the critical TSS reform in 1994, we also include
a post-reform dummy variable that equals 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise.
Finally, all control variables, excepting the dummy variables, are lagged by one period to
avoid any endogeneity bias.
An important decision on the estimation of the above spatial lag models concerns the
choice of the weighting matrix. The standard practice in the spatial econometrics literature
is to assume that geographically closer jurisdictions interact more strongly with each other.
This leads to two common methods for defining the weights. The first is a contiguity matrix,
where a value of 1 is assigned if two jurisdictions share the same border and 0 otherwise.
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The other alternative is to use the inverse distances between the two jurisdictions as weights.
As argued in some of the recent empirical tax competition literature, however, in the case of
competition for mobile capital, it is very likely that capital will go much beyond first order
neighbors, which renders the contiguity method less useful (Devereux et al., 2008; Klemm and
Van Parys, 2012). Beyond the geographical criterion, it has been suggested that jurisdictions
may regard as neighbors other jurisdictions that are similar to them economically and so
compete for the same types of firms or the same type of capital (Case et al., 1993). In
order to account for these considerations, we construct a benchmark weighting matrix that
incorporates both the physical distance between jurisdictions and the similarity of economy-
size between jurisdictions. More specifically, the typical element of the weighing matrix
is,
wij ≡

sijdij∑N
j=1 sijdij
for i 6= j
0 for i = j,
where sij is the inverse of the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita between
provinces i and j; dij is the inverse of distance between provinces i and j. With these weights,
a province that has a small difference in economy-size and is closer in geographic space would
receive a higher weight. In order to check the sensitivity of the results, we also employ an
alternative weighing matrix that is purely based on the similarity of economy-size.24
Estimation. In order to estimate specification (1) unbiasedly and efficiently, two critical
endogeneity issues need to be addressed. First, the lagged dependent variable is endogenous
since it is correlated with the state fixed effect in the composite error term (ηi + εit), which
renders biased and inconsistent results if OLS or fixed effect estimators are applied. Second,
the tax policies of competitors (the spatial lag variable) enter the specifications contempora-
neously, so that the competitors’ tax policies are endogenous and correlated with the error
term (εit) and OLS would yield a biased estimate of parameter δ (Anselin, 1988).
25
To circumvent both endogeneity problems, we employ the system GMM estimator devel-
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oped by Blundell and Bond (1998), one that has been used quite often in the recent studies
on tax competition with dynamic features (Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm and Van Parys,
2012). This estimator combines the moment conditions from both the first-differenced equa-
tion of the estimating equation and the estimating equation in levels, and then estimates the
parameters by GMM. In dealing with the endogenous variables, the system GMM estimator
uses lagged levels to instrument the endogenous differences and lagged first differences to
instrument levels. In addition, following the standard spatial econometrics literature (Kele-
jian and Prucha, 1998; Kelejian and Robinson, 1993), we also use as additional exogenous
instruments for the spatial lag variable the competitors’ weighted averages of the explanatory
variables, including weighted real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted government
consumption as percentage of GDP, and weighted proportion of urban population.26
The overall validity of the instruments used in the regressions as well as the serial corre-
lation in the residuals are evaluated by the Hansen test (or overidentifying restriction test)
and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test, respectively. Both statistics are necessary to confirm
the validity of the instruments used. Finally, given our small sample size and the significant
amount of additional instruments introduced, we collapse the instrument matrix in the es-
timation in order to avoid the problem of “too many instruments” discussed in Roodman
(2009a).27
Ideally one would also include time dummies in the specification (1) to prevent cross-
province contemporaneous correlation. However, doing so would generate two problems in
our context. Due to the large amount of instruments created by the system GMM estimator
together with the external instruments, adding time dummies to our relatively small sample
would lead to too many instruments which may weaken the Hansen test and overfit the en-
dogenous variables (Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2009b). Additionally, Devereux et al. (2008)
and Klemm and Van Parys (2012) point out that the inclusion of time dummies in a model
with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity issue among the spatial lag
variables and the time dummies,28 which makes it hard to identify the true impact of each
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variable. Therefore, following the suggestion by Devereux et al. (2008); Caldeira (2012) and
Klemm and Van Parys (2012), we add a linear time trend variable which captures a common
trend for all states, instead of using time dummies.
Development Zones as a Mechanism of Competition
In section 2, we argued that one of the main mechanisms for provincial governments to
carry tax competition to attract foreign investment is through the establishment of devel-
opment zones. To shed some light on this issue, we have to identify the extent to which
the establishment of development zones reduces the AETR on foreign investment, and how
this reduction of effective rates finally affects the foreign investment actually received by the
provinces.
Specification. We estimate the following structural specifications,
(2)
 FDIit = λτit + Z1it−1β1 + η1i + ν1t + ε1itτit = ρdit + δ∑j 6=iwijτjt + Z2it−1β2 + η2i + ν2t + ε2it,
to establish the linkage running from the introduction of a development zone (dit) to a lower
level of AETR (τit), and then to a higher level of foreign direct investment (FDI) received
by the provinces (FDIit). In the system equations (2), FDIit is measured as the ratio of
inward FDI flow to GDP of province i in year t; dit is the measure capturing the effect of
development zones of province i in year t,29 and it includes the following three indexes: a
dummy variable for the existence of development zones (dum devit), the accumulated num-
ber of development zones (dev numit), and the per capita accumulated land area occupied by
the development zones (dev landit); while the first index aims to identify whether the intro-
duction of development zones leads to an expected reduction of AETR, the last two indexes
go a step further to explore whether the intensity of development zones within the provinces
would have a second impact on the AETR; η1i and η2i are province-specific fixed effects
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capturing the unobserved heterogeneity across provinces that are constant over time; and
ν1t and ν2t are year dummies capturing the contemporaneous correlation among provinces.
In the FDI specification, besides τit, which captures the effect of tax rate on foreign
investment, we add a set of control variables (Z1it−1) similar to those in the tax rate equation,
including real GDP per capita, openness, government consumption as a percentage of GDP,
and share of urban population. In addition, we include a geographical dummy variable and a
post-reform dummy variable to capture the potential impacts of geographical characteristics
and institutional changes. The control variables in the tax rate specification, Z2it−1, cover
the whole list of variables we used in the previous subsection, including province size and
industrialization level. Finally, all control variables, with the exception of dummy variables,
are lagged by one period to avoid any bias arising from the possible joint determination of
these variables and the dependent variable.
Estimation. Estimation of the system equations (2) requires an effective methodology
to tackle several econometric issues simultaneously. First, appearance of the dependent
variable τit on the RHS in the FDI specification creates the usual endogeneity problem in
the estimation of simultaneous equations, which renders OLS estimators biased. However,
under the framework of 2SLS estimation, the system is identified as not all explanatory
variables in the tax rate equation are determinants of FDI location–those additional controls
implicitly serve as instruments for the endogenous tax rate variable in the FDI equation.
Second, the spatial lag variable on the RHS in the tax rate equation generates the same
endogeneity issue as the one we faced before; we therefore use the same method to cope with
it. That is, we use the competitors’ weighted average of explanatory variables as additional
exogenous instruments for the spatial lag variable. Finally, the possible omitted variables
would affect both equations, leading to inefficiency caused by the possible correlation of
the error terms ε1it and ε2it in the system. Thus we incorporate the seemingly unrelated
regression model to extend the 2SLS to a 3SLS model in order to address the endogeneity
problem and improve estimation efficiency.
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Data
Our panel dataset covers 30 provinces over the period 1993-2007. Tibet is not included
due to the lack of data availability. The selection of our observation period is based on data
availability for our measure of the AETR. Year 1993 is the earliest we can get access to
foreign tax revenue data; while year 2007 is the last the Chinese statistical office reports
the foreign tax revenue data separately. With China’s new Corporate Income Tax Law that
took effect on January 1 2008, there is a unified corporate income tax regime for foreign and
domestic enterprises. The data definitions, sources and summary statistics are presented in
Table 1.
We measure AETR as the actual tax revenue from foreign investors relative to the relevant
tax base. In particular, two indexes are constructed. The primary one (denoted as AETR1) is
defined as the ratio of total foreign tax revenues (shewai shuizhou zong’e) to total investment
of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The alternative index (denoted as AETR2), which is
employed for robustness checks, is defined as the ratio of total foreign tax revenues to total
registered capital (zhuce ziben) of FIEs. The common numerator in both measures reflects
the overall effective tax burden on foreign investment and should therefore be preferred to
definitions based on total income tax revenues of FIEs only.30 These measures of AETR
follow the method of Mendoza et al. (1994) that has been widely used in macroeconomic
analysis and some recent empirical studies of tax competition (e.g., Winner, 2005; Jacobs
et al., 2010). They are also deemed as the most suitable measures of effective tax rate in our
context for three reasons.31 First, the AETR captures both relevant income and non-income
taxes imposed on foreign investment, as well as all components determining the tax base, like
legal and/or illegal deductions, exemptions, tax credits and the enforcement of tax rules. All
these factors serve as important tools for provincial tax competition. Second, the AETR is an
aggregate measure of tax burden that fits well with the assumption of a representative agent
underlying most tax competition models. Third, since the AETR is a backward-looking
measure of an average effective rate, it is appropriate for measuring distributional burdens,
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and so it should be the relevant tax measure if jurisdictions compete for discrete location
of foreign investment (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). Data for calculating the AETRs are
extracted from various issues of the Tax Yearbook of China.
Information on the established development zones at the national and provincial levels is
provided in a file compiled and published by the National Development and Reform Com-
mission of China (NDRCC) with the assistance of the Ministry of Land and Resources and
the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in 2006. This file contains detailed
information on individual development zones including year of establishment, land area oc-
cupied, leading industry it belongs to, and others.32 We then aggregate the information from
individual to provincial level for estimation purposes.33
Data for all other variables are obtained from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook
and China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now turn to the discussion of our estimation results. Evidence of provincial tax
competition along with testing results for the three hypotheses laid out in section 2 are
documented in the first subsection. The structural estimation results supporting the role of
development zones as a mechanism for competition are presented next.
Provincial Tax Competition
Main results. Specification (1) is estimated using the system GMM method, along with
robust and finite sample corrected standard errors. The F-statistics for first stage regression
models, the Hansen test, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test are reported at the bottom
of each table, indicating the validity of the instruments used.
Based on both measures of AETR, Table 2 reports the main results from estimations
controlling and not for the time trend. For all four regressions, we find a statistically sig-
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nificant coefficient for the competitors’ weighted AETRs in line with Hypothesis 1 that a
province’s tax rate reacts strategically to tax rates in other provinces. A positive value of
this coefficient further confirms a general finding in the relevant literature to the point that
a province raises (cuts) its own AETR if other provinces raise (reduce) their AETRs. The
magnitudes of the coefficients, varying across the definitions of AETR and model specifica-
tions, range from 0.51 to 0.87. It shows that the inclusion of time trend tends to reduce
the extent of strategic interaction among provinces. Intuitively, this may suggest that the
changes of tax rates among different provinces are partially systematic and so the inclusion
of a common time trend can pick up this effect and lead to a smaller strategic interaction.
In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients become smaller when the alternative measure
of AETR is used, which is not surprising given that AETR2 is a less accurate measure of
effective tax rate. This measure uses total registered capital of FIEs as the denominator,
which only reflects the capital endowment of the enterprises at the time of registration and
may not vary significantly over time. Nevertheless, all four coefficients of weighted AETRs
are smaller than one, which ensures the stationarity of the spatial lag model. Province size
enters the model with a positive sign–a result that is consistent with Hypothesis 2, though
the coefficients are only statistically significant when not controlling for the time trend. This
may again suggest that a common trend of population changes across provinces explains a
larger share of the variation of population size over time.34 Turning to Hypothesis 3, the re-
sults reveal supporting evidence by showing a positive and significant effect of the province’s
industrialization level, though this effect is relatively small in magnitude.
For the control variables, the lagged dependent variable has a positive and significant
coefficient, indicating higher persistence of the tax policies. Government consumption as a
percentage of GDP has negative and significant coefficients in general, suggesting that with
higher demand for revenues, a lower effective tax rate is chosen in order to attract more tax
base. Other control variables are generally not statistically significant.
Robustness. In order to test for the robustness of the basic results, we conduct sensitivity
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analysis along three dimensions. First, we utilize an alternative specification to control for
the time fixed effects. As noted earlier, the inclusion of time fixed effects in the dynamic
specification (1) would weaken the Hansen test and overfit endogenous variables in the es-
timation. However, omitting the time fixed effects may generate another source of bias—a
common spatial shock. That is, the identified strategic interaction over tax rates may also
be interpreted as a result from a common spatial shock across all provinces. To address
this possibility, we drop the lagged dependent variable τit−1 in specification (1) to estimate
a static tax reaction function and controlling for both province fixed effects and time fixed
effects. The weighted AETRs is again treated as an endogenous variable and instrumented
by the same set of instruments we used before. Second, we employ an alternative weighting
matrix that is purely based on the similarity of economy-size among provinces to character-
ize the competition pattern. Finally, we re-estimate specification (1) with a reduced sample
size that excludes the four province-level municipalities and other provinces in the coastal re-
gion.35 The objective is to examine the strategic interaction among relatively small provinces
in economy-size, where all sub-provincial governments are atomistic from the viewpoint of
the province. Presence of strategic interaction among these provinces would confirm that,
at least partially, our main results have not been driven by any possible vertical competition
between provincial governments and sub-provincial governments–even though, in theory, we
have explicitly ruled out this possibility in the Chinese context.
Table 3 presents the robustness estimation results, which are highly consistent and robust
with our main ones. They confirm the existence of a positive and significant strategic inter-
action over tax rates among provinces. On the effects of provincial characteristics, province
size remains statistically insignificant when controlling for time trend or time fixed effects.
Industrialization level of a province has the expected effect, though it turns to be statisti-
cally insignificant in the estimations with a reduced sample size—in large part due to the
elimination of information from provinces with higher level of industrialization in the coastal
region.
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The Role of Development Zones
Main results. Table 5 presents the estimation results for the structural specifications
(2) using 3SLS approach. The dependent variables are noted on the top of each column.
dum devit is used to examine the impact of the introduction of development zones. In light
of the time it takes from the initial establishment of zones to attract foreign investment and
to result in tax revenues, it is reasonable to expect more than one year lag. We experiment
with a lag of up to 5 years to capture this effect. As shown in Table 5, in all FDI equations,
the AETR is always negative and significant, confirming the traditional expectations. In
all the tax rate equations, the introduction of development zones is found to be negatively
associated with the AETR on foreign investment, though as expected, a lagged effect of two
to five years is detected. Thus, we find support for a channel running from the introduction
to development zone to a lower AETR to a higher level of FDI.
On top of the negative impact of development zones on the AETR, we ask whether the
intensity of development zones plays a further role in reducing the effective tax rates faced
by foreign investors. To do so, we add the explanatory variables dev numit and dev landit,
the intensity of development zones, and re-estimate the models. The results are summarized
in Table 5; the results for the control variables are not reported to save space. We find
a statistically insignificant coefficient for our measure of intensity of development zones.
Establishing more development zones or enlarging their sizes does not appear to further
contribute to lower AETRs. This may be because the scope of manipulation and discretion
for local authorities cannot be changed significantly with the changes of development zones;
a further expansion of zones can just be used to contain a larger amount of FDI. Note finally
that the coefficients for province size are positive and statistically significant in the tax rate
equations, which gives support to Hypothesis 2.
Robustness. We run several additional estimations to check the robustness of our results.
We re-estimate the structural specifications by using both the alternative measure of AETR
(AETR2) and the alternative definition of weighting scheme respectively. In addition, instead
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of measuring the FDI flows as a percentage of GDP, we also try to measure it as the log of
per capita FDI received by each province. Overall, we find consistent evidence in supporting
our main argument. The results are not reported for space reasons.
Lastly, given our interest in validating development zones as an important conduit for
provincial governments to manipulate effective tax rates and so involving a tax competition
game, we also test for the strategic interaction over development zones among provinces
directly. If a positive interaction is found, that would give us further robust evidence on
the role of development zones. We perform this analysis by modifying specification (1)
replacing the tax rate variables (τit) with the development zones variables (dev numit and
dev landit), as the strategic variables in the estimations. The results, as reported in Table
6, are comparable with each other. They confirm that regardless of the measurement of
development zones, either in its number (dev numit) or its size (dev landit), there exists a
positive and significant strategic interaction among provinces. The estimated coefficients
take values around 0.5-0.6, indicating a relatively strong strategic interaction over the setup
of development zones among provinces. The coefficients for the provincial characteristics
are in general statistically insignificant, which is not surprising given their weak economic
significance in the setting up of development zones.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper aims to answer two important questions on the Chinese economy. First, does
provincial tax competition for foreign capital exist? A positive certain answer would provide
support for the prevalent view of the role of local governments as one of the main engines
for China’s rapid economic growth over the past thirty years. Second, if the answer to first
question is “yes”, then the next important question is how is this competition conducted in
the Chinese context where there is highly centralized tax system?
In answering the first question, we calculate for each province the AETR on foreign
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investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign investors for the period
1993-2007 covering 30 provinces. Our estimation results from dynamic spatial lag models
provide strong evidence in support of the existence of positively strategic tax interactions
among provincial governments in China. In line with the theoretical hypotheses, our results
highlight the economic significance of a province’ spatial characteristics in determining its
choice of AETR. In particular, provinces with a higher level of industrialization tend to select
a higher level of tax rate than provinces with a lower level of industrialization. Although,
in theory, larger provinces are predicted to choose higher tax rates, our results only provide
week support for this argument.
The answer to the second question lies on our observation of the booming trend in devel-
opment zones that took place contemporaneously with China’s rapid economic growth. Given
the endorsed favorable tax policies and the large local administrative discretion granted by
the central government to the development zones, we explore the establishment of develop-
ment zones as a conduit for provincial tax competition. Our estimation results from the
structural models confirm this conjecture to the extent that the introduction of development
zones does lead to significant reduction of the AETR, which in turn successfully attract more
foreign investment.
Our findings have significant policy relevance. If the continued loss of farmland from
expanding development zones is deemed undesirable by the national authorities, there will
be a need to rethink some other national policies, in particular providing subnational gov-
ernments with significant measures of tax autonomy through which they may implement
their competition policies. In all, some degree of competition at the subnational level can be
beneficial to help keep the public sector more efficient, but that may be achieved with less
detrimental externalities.
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Notes
1See definition and more discussion on development zones in the next section.
2See Zheng (2006) table 3 for a detailed list of the major preferential tax policies for
foreign capital investing in the development zones in China.
3Using Chinese provincial panel data for 1980-2004, Caldeira (2012) provides evidence
on the existence of public spending interactions among provinces by estimating a spatial
econometric model. In another recent paper, Agostini et al. (2010) examine the strategic
interactions over the provision of public projects among 86 villages in rural China, where
village election has been launched to increase the accountability of local officials in rural
areas.
4This was a highly centralized fiscal system. Under this system, local governments were
acting as the agents for the central government to collect revenues and execute spending
mandates. Local governments just did not have their own budgets, and all revenues and
expenditures were approved by the central government.
5See Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao (2010) for a detailed discussion of the expenditure as-
signment in China.
6See Xu (2011) for an excellent review. Li and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence
that the central government indeed employs promotion and termination of provincial gover-
nors to induce provincial economic growth.
7In line with positioning and functions, they may be officially called economic development
zones, economic and technological development zones, new and high-tech industrial devel-
opment zones, industrial parks, exporting processing zones, bonded zones, border economic
co-operative zones, etc. The government made clear the targets of development zones as
“construction primarily relies on attracting and utilizing foreign capital; primary economics
forms are Sino-foreign joint ventures and partnerships as well as wholly foreign-owned en-
terprises” (Wang, 2013). Therefore, domestic investors are not admitted to settle in these
zones, only except a very limited amount of certain types of domestic enterprises that settle
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in some specific types of development zones (e.g., domestic high-tech enterprises in new and
high-tech industrial development zones).
8In the literature, location-based tax incentives have been shown to be successful in at-
tracting more investment. For example, Hanson and Rohlin (2011) find that the federal
Empowerment Zone program in U.S. is responsible for attracting about 2.2 new establish-
ments per 1,000 existing establishments in the zone areas.
9See Wang (2013) for more description on other non-tax preferential policies, including
property rights protection and land use policy, granted by the central government.
10There may be a concern that is generated by the relative extent of labor immobility.
That is, due to the household registration (i.e. Hukou) system in China, labor mobility
across regions is largely restricted; therefore, the expansion of development zones activies may
reduce the economic activities of domestic firms outside the zones, resulting in a reduction
of tax base outside the zones However, Wang (2013) provides quantitative evidence that the
introduction of development zones neither crowds-in nor crowds-out domestic investment.
11Although the establishment of national-level development zones is at the discretion of
the central government, provincial governments, indeed, exert an important role in influ-
encing the central government’s decision via their lobbying efforts. Thus, to some extent,
national-level development zones are also a reflection of the competition outcome of provin-
cial governments.
12We also want to report the corresponding values for total FDI received in all development
zones and/or total FDI received in provincial-level development zones, however, these data
are not available.
13Numerous subsequent works have extended and refined this view in a variety of directions
(See Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004, for excellent surveys of the tax competition
literature). Nevertheless, there are also a few others pointing out that in the presence of
inter-jurisdictional externalities, this benchmark result may not necessarily hold (see, for
example, Pinto, 2007).
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14Ideally, testing the existence of strategic interaction among jurisdictions is not sufficient
to fully validate the emergence of tax competition, as this strategic interaction may also
arise through other possible channels, such as yardstick competition or simply policy diffu-
sion. The distinction among the various possible channels to explain the detected strategic
interaction in tax rates remains a difficult task in the literature. The tax competition avenue
appears to be the most commonly accepted explanation.
15Noticeable exceptions include Chirinko and Wilson (2011) and Parchet (2012). Both of
these papers find a negative strategic interaction in tax rates among U.S. states and Swiss
municipalities, respectively. Rork (2003) concludes that the slope of tax reaction functions
depends on the mobility of the tax base.
16For instance, despite the increasing mobility of capital and competitive pressure on
the governments in the European Union, the variation of effective average tax rates among
members remains high, ranging from 8.8 percent in Bulgaria to 35.5 percent in Germany in
2007 (Elschner and Vanborren, 2009).
17Country size is measured in these studies by the population. However, this result is
shown to be quite consistent with the other measures of country size. For example, Marceau
et al. (2010) model country size by the stocks of immobile capital, and obtain a similar result.
18Baldwin and Krugman (2004) derive this result under a sequential game setting assuming
the more-developed region assumes the leader role. Therefore, a confirmation of Hypothesis
3 may also suggest the emergence of a Stackelberg type game in reality.
19Therefore, horizontal competition among sub-provincial governments should not be an
issue, since they act as agents of provincial governments at the local level, and so their
behaviors, at most, are only the reflections of provincial governments’ policies. On the other
hand, vertical competition between provincial and sub-provincial governments is unlikely to
exist in the Chinese context, given what as we just described that provincial governments
maintain absolute top-down control within the province.
20Note that our focus is on competition among Chinese provinces, and therefore we do
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not take into account the potential competition of those provinces near international borders
with neighboring countries. Geys and Osterloh (2013) point out the possibility of this kind
of border effect.
21For robustness checks, we also use the share of non-agricultural GDP in total GDP as
the measurement of industrialization level. The results are largely unchanged.
22Note that the error term εit may also be modeled as a spatial process. However, under our
system GMM estimation framework (as elaborated below), the possible presence of spatial
error dependence would not bias our estimate of the spatial parameter δ in specification (1).
Since neighbors’ tax rates are instrumented, the estimate of δ should not be affected by the
potential spatial auto-correlation in the error term εit (see for example, Kelejian and Prucha,
1998; Revelli, 2001; Agostini et al., 2010).
23The shares of young and elderly population may be alternatively better proxies for the
demographic features of a province. Unfortunately, annual data for these variables are not
available at the provincial level.
24Instead of using the difference in GDP per capita to capture the similarity among the
provinces, we also tried the difference in the level of industrialization. We obtained quite
similar results and so they are not reported in the paper. But all results are available upon
request.
25This second endogeneity is a typical issue in the spatial econometrics literature. Two
conventional approaches for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter are sug-
gested in the literature. The first approach is to use instrumental variables (Anselin, 1988),
where the use of the weighted average of competitors’ exogenous or control variables as in-
struments are typically suggested (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Kelejian and Robinson, 1993).
An alternative approach is to rely on the maximum likelihood approach. Under this method,
a non-linear reduced form for the original equation is computed by inverting the system. A
non-linear optimization routine is then used to estimate the spatial parameter. See Brueck-
ner (2003) for more discussion. Although both approaches yield consistent estimates of the
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spatial parameter, the later method is generally more challenging in computation.
26The weights are constructed in the same way as discussed previously.
27A finite sample size with too many instruments may weaken the Hansen test to the point
where it generates implausibly good p values of 1.000 (Bowsher, 2002).
28The reason here is that the inclusion of time dummies is equivalent to adding the average
value of the dependent variable in each year, which by its nature is highly correlated with
the spatial lag variables.
29Given our focus on provincial tax competition, all development zones data refers to
development zones set up by provincial governments only.
30This is because, as we elaborated in the previous sections, offering preferential income
tax rates or reductions to foreign investors is not the only tool for provincial governments to
compete with each other. Exerting different degrees of tax enforcements on other indirect
taxes and fees such as VAT, local business tax, land usage tax, and even individual income
tax can also be important means for competition. According to our calculation, FIEs income
tax revenue only accounts for a small share of total tax revenue collected from FIEs, ranging
from 8.9 percent in year 1993 to 19.2 percent in year 2006.
31Note that these measures of AETR also suffer from some concerns. Among them one
important concern is that the AETR may vary considerably according to the underlying
economic conditions in a province, even if there is no change in tax regimes (Devereux
et al., 2008). This issue can be addressed if some alternative measures of AETR, as the
ones proposed by Devereux and Griffith (2003) that are based on forward-looking concepts,
are employed. Even though, given data availability, we are unable to create such kinds of
tax measures as robustness check; we believe, this issue should not be significant since the
provincial fixed effects in our estimations will be able to pick up some of these effects.
32The file is in the title of “Directory of China Development Zone Audit Announcement
(zhongguo kaifaqu shenhe gonggao)”, which is freely available online at
http://www1.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbgg/2007gonggao/W020070406535176330304.pdf/.
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33Note that the data on the development zones are available from 1984 to 2006. So
whenever the development zone variables enter the specifications, the estimation period is
up to 2006.
34This result is consistent with Jacobs et al. (2010), which also find an insignificant effect
of states’ population size on the U.S. states’ tax settings in a dynamic estimation framework.
35These include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi,
Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, and Zhejiang.
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TABLE 2: Provincial Tax Competition: Main Results
Dependent variable Avg eff tax rate Avg eff tax rate
(AETR1) (AETR2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg eff tax rate t− 1 0.237** 0.219* 0.556*** 0.543***
(1.96) (1.88) (3.47) (3.78)
Weighted avg eff tax rate 0.869*** 0.704*** 0.608*** 0.505**
of neighbors (7.21) (3.88) (3.23) (2.26)
Population t− 1 (pop) 0.003† 0.001 0.005* 0.003
(1.42) (0.44) (1.81) (1.09)
Industrialization t− 1 (indust) 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006** 0.007**
(3.01) (2.21) (2.19) (2.53)
Per capita GDP t− 1 (gdppc) -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.92) (-0.59) (-1.44) (-0.81)
Proportion of urban population -0.004 -0.008 -0.000 -0.012
t− 1 (urban) (-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.02) (-0.40)
Openness t− 1 (open) -0.001 0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(-0.35) (0.66) (-0.66) (-0.42)
Government consumption as % -0.326*** -0.279*** -0.284** -0.300***
of GDP t− 1 (govcon) (-4.46) (-2.98) (-2.52) (-2.64)
Reform dummy (dum reform) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.49) (-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.24)
Coastal dummy (dum coastal) -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(-1.03) (-0.81) (0.35) (0.30)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 416 416 416 416
First stage F-statistics 45.58 43.29 60.89 57.13
Hansen test (p-value) 0.310 0.265 0.342 0.235
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0183 0.0357 0.175 0.186
AR(2) (p-value) 0.409 0.327 0.286 0.284
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1993-2007. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. †
represents significance at the 10% level under one-tail test.
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TABLE 6: Development Zones as a Mechanism of Competition: Robustness Checks
Dependent variable Development zone numbers Development zone areas
(dev num) (dev land)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Development zone numbers t− 1 0.785*** 0.826***
(7.88) (7.06)
Weighted development zone numbers 0.653*** 0.615***
of neighbors (5.37) (4.56)
Development zone areas t− 1 0.854*** 0.872***
(10.43) (9.56)
Weighted development zone areas 0.526*** 0.518***
of neighbors (4.13) (3.12)
Population t− 1 (pop) 0.000 -0.000 -0.286 -0.026
(0.08) (-0.13) (-0.54) (-0.05)
Industrialization t− 1 (indust) 0.000 0.001 1.715* 1.914**
(0.00) (0.22) (1.74) (1.96)
Per capita GDP t− 1 (gdppc) -0.003 -0.003 -1.103 -1.566
(-0.93) (-0.51) (-0.84) (-0.59)
Proportion of urban population -0.000 -0.002 -6.704 -6.012
t− 1 (urban) (-0.01) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-0.83)
Openness t− 1 (open) 0.001 0.002 0.470 0.002
(0.42) (0.65) (0.35) (0.00)
Government consumption as % -0.139* -0.140** -71.769 -51.735
of GDP t− 1 (govcon) (-1.73) (-2.16) (-1.08) (-0.68)
Reform dummy (dum reform) -0.006*** -0.004*** -3.394*** -3.018***
(-4.62) (-4.99) (-3.53) (-3.25)
Coastal dummy (dum coastal) -0.001 -0.002 -1.291 -0.768
(-0.58) (-0.53) (-1.46) (-0.64)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 639 639 639 639
First stage F-statistics 233.96 217.02 306.96 285.76
Hansen test (p-value) 0.584 0.705 0.561 0.530
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0652 0.0643 0.0508 0.0503
AR(2) (p-value) 0.518 0.500 0.239 0.243
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1984-2006. Models are estimated by system GMM
estimator. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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FIGURE 1: Evolution of the Setup of Development Zones in China, 1984-2003.
Source: NDRCC (2006)
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